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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Developments in citizen oversight of the police have not gone unnoticed by 
policing scholars. Though the concept has been controversial and heavily debated, 
noticeable increases in these mechanisms are evident on both national and international 
levels, especially in the most populated metropolitan areas in the United States. There is, 
however, a research gap in that available scholarly inquiries have not empirically 
examined the existence of citizen oversight within an explanatory framework, cognizant 
of plausible theoretical assumptions. This research examines the existence of citizen 
oversight of the police in the 100 largest cities/agencies. The analysis supports the 
contention that the presence of collective bargaining, higher crime rates, and higher 
police-citizen ratios are statistically related to mere existence. The rate of citizen 
complaints (a factor alluded to in past research) fails to reach the pre-requisite level of 
significance. Findings are discussed within the context of environmental determinism, 
and implications for future study are outlined. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Until the late 1920s little serious attention was paid to police accountability in the 
United States. The onset of the reform era in policing (circa 1930) caused both scholars 
and police practitioners to reconsider police culture and behavior on the streets.  
Emanating from this reform ideology derived the conceptualization and existence of 
external police accountability among other proposed structural and philosophical 
changes. External review of the police has been a controversial and polemic issue with 
strong opposition on both sides – the police and community. Discourse in the area of 
external review has pondered two important questions: who polices the police and who 
should? Throughout its extensive and diverse century-old history, the creation of external 
accountability mechanisms has interested scholars in the fields of political science, 
sociology, history, criminal justice, and criminology. The existing body of research has 
been primarily descriptive examining growth, structure, function, and effectiveness.  
While the extant research has indeed grown, less than ample attention has been paid to 
what may be considered the most important question, why do these entities exist in the 
first place? Though scholarly discourse has certainly pondered this important question, 
the debate has been both limited and, decidedly, unscientific. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Albeit not specifically addressing explanation, past research does hint at some 
plausible explanatory variables (i.e., racial diversity, political change, unionization, and 
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population size). The essential problem is that most of this information has been logical, 
but nevertheless, anecdotal. Therefore, the need to develop both empirically- and 
theoretically-informed frameworks for understanding developments in this area is 
evident. Recognizing that predicting growth as opposed to predicting existence prompts 
divergent methodological approaches – one longitudinal and the other cross-sectional, the 
analysis here is limited to understanding and predicting the mere existence of external 
review of the police. The salience of the existence/growth factors is subjected to 
empirical analysis in order to provide a better framework for understanding contemporary 
external structures of police accountability. Theoretically, the analysis is placed within 
the broader context of environmental determinism and/or strategic choice orientations.  
The relevance of these theoretical positions will be discussed in greater detail later in the 
analysis. 
 Before examining the possible explanations for the existence of external police 
review, it is necessary to place police accountability within a historical context – tracing 
chronological developments since the 1920s. It is also necessary to synthesize the 
existing research on the topic, which helps to highlight some of the shortcomings 
addressed previously. Within the metamorphosis of external police review, the basic 
concept has been re-packaged, re-designed, re-named, and has, at times, all but 
disappeared, only to re-emerge. Once the concept has been clarified both practically and 
conceptually, potential factors thought to influence the existence of external review can 
be investigated more logically. After review and reflection, this analysis seeks to provide 
a foundation and beginning framework for understanding the existence of external police 
accountability structures. 
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
 
Like in any democratic society, especially the United States, the problem of 
accountability in police agencies is one of the most difficult to address (Banks, 2013; 
Prenzler & Ronken, 2001; Stone & Bobb, 2002; Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 
1992). Throughout the history of policing in the United States, a number of programs and 
policies have been created and implemented in order to help maintain a balance between 
governmental, bureaucratic power and bureaucratic responsiveness, with external review 
procedures as one of many platforms to address this issue (Banks, 2013; Prenzler & 
Ronken, 2001; Saltzstein, 1989; Stone & Bobb, 2002). As noted by Hudson (1971) and 
Burns and Hollwedel (2012), the civil rights movement roused interest among citizens 
concerning accountability in police agencies. The present research examines the 
existence of external accountability of the police in the United States; therefore, it is 
appropriate that we briefly consider the history and prevalence of these relatively new 
mechanisms. 
In the United States, the idea of external review of policing first appeared in Los 
Angeles in 1928 (Banks, 2013; Walker, 2001). As the concept gradually began to spread, 
the Wickersham Commission, created by President Herbert Hoover, promoted external 
review and was the first comprehensive study of the American criminal justice system. 
From 1935 to the late 1950s, police departments in multiple cities attempted to adopt the 
concept without success. There were experimentations in New York City, Washington, 
D.C., Minneapolis, Rochester, and Philadelphia (Banks, 2013). 
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While many external review organizations failed to sustain their existence, the 
Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB), created in 1958, was able to endure for 
nearly a decade. Even though almost all proposals and attempts at external review were 
dismissed and eliminated by the 1960s, the PAB provided a breakthrough in reforming 
the methods of police accountability by successfully introducing an innovative citizen 
judgment of police policies, practices, and activities (Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 
1992). Conversely, those individuals outside of the civil rights and civil liberties 
communities contributed to this elimination by declaring that the idea of external review 
was radical and dangerous (Bobb, 2002; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Hudson, 1971; 
Walker, 2001). 
Shortly after the elimination of most external committees during the 1960s, a 
crisis of police-community relations became evident. This crisis, along with the 
burgeoning civil rights movement, provided a national platform for discourse on the need 
for external review of the police (Bobb, 2002; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Hudson 1971; 
Walker, 2001). Instances of police brutality, abuse of discretion, and racial discrimination 
gave support to proposals for changes in the way in which citizens could complain about 
the police (Bobb, 2002; Farrow & Pham, 2003; Ferdik, 2013; Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000, 
Hollwedel & Burns, 2012). Proposed changes resembled a rights-based, idiosyncratic 
perspective on the relationship between the police and citizens. Quite often, this resulted 
in promotion of individual redress for certain wrongdoings by a particular officer as the 
only objective of police accountability (Bobb, 2002; Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; 
Hollwedel & Burns, 2012). 
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Throughout the 1960s multiple research studies confirmed the backlash whereby 
citizens were threatened with criminal charges if complaints were made on an officer 
(Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Walker, 2001). Additionally, the 
President’s Crime Commission reported in 1967 that officers in larger cities were 
inadequately trained, poorly educated, and hardly ever supervised. This lack of 
preparedness on the part of law enforcement continued to contribute to the ongoing 
debate over whether external review should be implemented in cities plagued with these 
issues. By the end of the 1960s, many cities had unsuccessfully implemented external 
agencies (Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). Those agencies that had mild, short-
lived success ultimately came to their demise largely due to police unions utilizing 
political leverage in order to defeat proposals for external review (Walker, 2001). While 
this provided an era of decline for external review of the police, concern over police 
accountability began to surface as a central issue in policing in United States. 
As concern over police accountability grew, many began to challenge and support 
the notion of reforming the method of police review, ultimately leading to a resurgence of 
external review (Bobb, 2002; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Walker, 2001; Walker & 
Bumphus, 1992). Contributing to this resurgence, the Knapp Commission in New York 
City published in 1972, revealed concern over police accountability and the ability of 
departments and agencies to review their own practices (Prenzler, 2000; Prenzler & 
Ronken, 2001; Walker, 2001). This report slowly spread throughout the nation as police 
accountability weighed heavily on departments. Thus, many departments began to 
implement some form of external review to address public concerns (Walker, 2001). 
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 By the 1980s and 1990s, citizen oversight (as opposed to review) had become a 
national movement (Banks, 2013; De Angelis, 2009; Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 
1992). The new terminology of citizen oversight marked a new era in police 
accountability and sought to, at least, euphemistically, separate from the former 
terminology, which had fallen out of favor (Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). 
As further evidence of a new era, the National Association of Citizen Oversight of Law 
Enforcement was created in 1985 (Walker and Bumphus, 1992). The concern over who 
polices the police had grown more prominent. As large cities saw change occurring with 
methods of police accountability, it had now become apparent that the growth of external 
oversight was in full swing (Banks, 2013; Walker, 2001). In 1992 over two-thirds of the 
police departments in our country’s 50 largest cities had some form of external oversight 
of the police (De Angelis, 2009; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Walker, 2001; Walker & 
Bumphus, 1992). Growth continued to occur, and as of 2000, over 100 hundred different 
oversight committees were in existence with approximately 80 percent of those 
organizations in larger metropolitan cities (Bobb, 2002; De Angelis, 2009; Farrow & 
Pham, 2003; Walker, 2001). 
 Although there appears to be a traceable history of external oversight in this 
country, there are other facets of this concept that are somewhat ambiguous. From 
international developments to the variety in typologies, external oversight is an intricate 
and intriguing practice. For example, external oversight is not solely constricted to the 
United States and its police agencies (Banks, 2013; Porter & Prenzler, 2012; Ramirez & 
Randall, 2011; Stone, 2007; Stone & Bobb, 2002). Other countries implementing external 
oversight of the police include Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Columbia, the United Kingdom, 
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Australia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and New Zealand (Banks, 2013; Porter & Prenzler, 2012; 
Ramirez & Randall, 2011; Stone, 2007; Stone & Bobb, 2002). Like the United States, 
oversight organizations present in other countries also use a variety of mechanisms and 
typologies to practice external oversight (Banks, 2013; Porter & Prenzler, 2012; Ramirez 
& Randall, 2011; Stone, 2007; Stone & Bobb, 2002).  
 Previous and current research provides us with a detailed description of the 
various methods utilized to practice citizen oversight. However, some police 
organizations may incorporate more than one type of oversight (Banks, 2013; De 
Angelis, 2009; Finn, 2000; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Porter & Prenzler, 2012; Prenzler 
& Ronken, 2001; Stone & Bobb, 2002; Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). Even 
though there are four common types of oversight, some researchers contend that these 
types can be narrowed down to a smaller number (Banks, 2013; De Angelis, 2009; Finn, 
2000; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Porter & Prenzler, 2012; Stone & Bobb, 2002; Walker, 
2001; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). Therefore, it is better to clarify these types by 
discussing them individually so as to not confuse the different techniques of oversight.   
The first type of oversight involves citizens investigating allegations and 
revealing findings to the chief administrative officer (Banks, 2013; Finn, 2000; 
Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Porter & Prenzler; 2012; Prenzler & Ronken, 2001; Stone & 
Bobb, 2002; Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). The second oversight category is 
where police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; then, citizens are able 
to review and recommend that a chief or sheriff accept or reject the findings from police 
investigations. The third type of citizen oversight incorporates an appeals process where 
complainants can appeal the discoveries of the investigation of a police or sheriff 
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department to citizens for oversight and review. These citizens ultimately review and 
recommend their own conclusions to a chief or sheriff. The final type of oversight grants 
an auditor investigative responsibility over the complaint process of a law enforcement 
agency. After investigating the complaint process, the auditor is obligated to report on the 
thoroughness and fairness of the aforementioned process to the public and police or 
sheriff’s department (Banks, 2013; Finn, 2000; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Porter & 
Prenzler, 2012; Prenzler & Ronken, 2001; Stone & Bobb, 2002; Walker, 2001; Walker & 
Bumphus, 1992). Though contemporary agencies exhibit various combinations of these 
types, all agencies are advisory in nature (Walker 2001). 
 Even though external oversight takes on many forms in various settings, what can 
the available research tell us about its creation and growth? Does the extant research 
allow us to better understand the existence of citizen oversight? Lastly, what 
methodological approaches have been utilized to examine this phenomenon? Some 
research does hint at possible influential factors that have allowed for creation and 
growth. In essence, it is pertinent we examine research that has already been completed in 
order to better understand external oversight and how this particular study attempts to 
shed light on the issue. 
 The extant research provides relevant information regarding the concept of police 
accountability utilizing citizen oversight. While some inquiries have been descriptive 
investigations considering growth and existence, others have taken a more explanatory 
purpose examining possible explanations of existence. Additionally, several examinations 
have been evaluative in nature by considering the effectiveness of external oversight and 
civilian complaint processes. Walker & Bumphus (1992), for example, discussed the 
	   9	  
effectiveness of external oversight while observing demographic characteristics and shifts 
in the balance of power in the context of municipal politics.  
 Additional information offered by some studies further exploits major issues that 
are considered to be relevant to the existence and growth of external oversight. These 
issues include the level of police-community relationships, behavior and actions of police 
officers, lack of police accountability, the type of external oversight implemented and its 
success, the influence of increased minority participation in local government, 
unionization, and other specific demographic features of the police environment (i.e., 
community and agency diversity). Although the aforementioned issues are important in 
relation to the growth and existence of external oversight, many are outside the scope of 
this research, but nevertheless should be briefly addressed for the purpose of continuity. 
 With some prevailing literature indicating that poor police-community 
relationships and the civil rights movement instigated the creation and growth of some 
oversight agencies, other research suggests that there are additional contributing factors 
(Banks, 2013; Bobb, 2002; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Hudson, 1971; Saltzstein, 1989; 
Stone & Bobb, 2002; Walker, 2001; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). Many researchers also 
contend that police accountability raised concern over a police officer’s behavior and 
actions and helped stimulate the creation and growth of oversight organizations. Still, 
others argue that police accountability is not responsible for creation and growth but 
instead creation and growth stems from the lack of police accountability (Banks, 2013; 
Bobb, 2002; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012; Stone & Bobb, 2002; Walker, 2001).  
Much of the research already present indicates that the behavior and actions of 
officers, due to the lack of police accountability, initially fueled factors that contributed 
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to the creation of external oversight (Burns & Hollwedel, 2012; Goldsmith & Lewis, 
2000; Ferdik, 2013; Farrow & Pham, 2003; Stone & Merrick, 2002; De Angelis, 2009; 
Bobb, 2002). In addition, many researchers have studied other factors as potential 
influential reasons why a department adopts and implements external oversight. One of 
these factors includes the type of external review that is adopted by a department. As 
mentioned above, there is a multitude of methods that can be incorporated in the external 
oversight process. Studies by Prenzler & Ronken (2001) and Perez (2000) point out the 
type of external review implemented by a department can predict whether or not that 
department decides to use a specific type and if it is successful. This also insinuates the 
notion that, depending on the type of method and its success, a local government’s 
decision to implement external oversight can influence other departments to do the same. 
In addition to the type of external oversight and its success, there are other 
research themes that have been utilized. For example, some studies have noted that the 
citizen complaint process for a department can be seen as a potential influencing factor as 
to why external oversight might be implemented. These studies imply that the quality of 
the citizen complaint process greatly influences the imposition of citizen oversight 
(Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Walker, 2001; Burns & Hollwedel, 2012). The concept of 
poor police-community relations with reference to a citizen complaint process does not 
necessarily mean there is a poor or unattended relationship between the police and 
community. On the other hand, it could mean that a citizen complaint process may not be 
efficient enough to fit the needs and desires of how a community would like its police 
department to handle certain issues.  
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Some research has also observed the influence of increased minority participation 
in local governments as yet another influential factor for creating external oversight 
(Walker & Bumphus, 1992; Saltzstein, 1989). Saltzstein (1989) indicates in her study that 
in some urban jurisdictions the implementation of external review of the police stemmed 
from a form of community-oriented policing geared to the needs of African American 
communities. In other words, external review of the police became a form of community-
oriented policing to help address issues concerning a particular minority population. 
Satlzstein (1989) alludes to the notion that incorporating certain minority groups into the 
external review process enhances and addresses the issue of police-community 
relationships and provides an example of how external oversight can be instrumental in 
alleviating some community issues.  
Burns & Hollwedel (2012) comment on the issue of police-community 
relationships in regards to the misuse and abuse of police authority as another reason for 
creating external oversight of police. They propose that the underlying premise of 
external oversight is the notion that even though citizens have to abide by a police 
officer’s authority in terms of enforcing the law, they still retain the right to scrutinize 
externally through an unbiased and impartial review. Therefore, departmental 
experiences with misuse and abuse of authority may prompt the creation of external 
accountability methods in an effort to resolve both real and perceived problems in 
policing.  
Walker & Bumphus (1992) also discuss the various factors for the existence and 
growth of external oversight. As part of their study, they indicate that demographic 
characteristics of cities do not appear to be a factor in the creation or growth of external 
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oversight. While some external review procedures exist in cities with large African 
American populations, they also indicate that it exists in those with small minority 
populations as well. Regarding the growth of external review, Walker & Bumphus (1992) 
note that a significant change in the balance of power in the context of municipal politics 
may be one explanation for this growth. These authors suggest that an increase in African 
American political power, specifically in those cities where African Americans represent 
a majority of voters and where black mayors have been elected has resulted in the growth 
of external oversight. Along with possible shifts in political power, these authors note the 
influence of local police unions in defeating citizen oversight/review proposals. 
While few studies have attempted to explain the creation and growth of external 
oversight of the police, there is still a gap in the research. In other words, there are other 
potential influencing factors that could explain this phenomenon. Even though poor 
police-community relationships, misuse and abuse of police authority, and citizen 
complaint processes might explain some instances of creation and growth, these variables 
are beyond the scope of this analysis as they imply longitudinal and/or historical data 
collection. Other variables that have yet to be considered (empirically) include crime 
rates, race and gender diversity in mayoral leadership, poverty level, the police-citizen 
ratio of a city, agency demographic make-up, level of citizen complaints, and agency 
collective bargaining abilities. Obviously, agency or jurisdictional size is an important 
variable, but with regards to the 100 largest jurisdictions, size can conceptually be 
considered a constant. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Theoretical Context 
 
 
When contemplating how external oversight was initially created and has 
continued to grow, one must consider the theoretical explanations for emergence, 
existence, and sustainability. Conceptually, why do these accountability mechanisms 
exist? Additionally, what is the broader theoretical framework that may shed some light 
on growth and existence? Answering some of the foregoing questions may help 
illuminate why local governments and police administrations decide to implement 
external oversight. These important considerations lead us to observe two plausible 
theoretical positions, environmental determinism and strategic choice. Before delving 
into the application of these theories to this research, it is necessary to understand what 
each theory incorporates. 
With both theoretical perspectives falling under the broader concept of 
organizational adaptation, each has its own distinct characteristics. In addition, there has 
been a prevailing assumption in literature for some time that strategic choice and 
environmental determinism represent mutually exclusive, opposing explanations for 
organizational behavior, and ultimately organizational adaptation (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 
1985; Bedeian, 1990). At the opposite end of the spectrum, scholars have also suggested 
that the separation indicates a false dichotomy, indicating that determinism and strategic 
choice exist on a continuum (Crouch & Farrell, 2004; Bedeian, 1990; Child, 1997 
Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998). However, present research suggests that environmental 
determinism and strategic choice can indeed be viewed as mutually inclusive 
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explanations for organizational behavior, which leads to organizational adaptation. 
Although these forms of organizational behavior feed off one another, they still have 
diverse meanings and powers of explanation (Crouch & Farrell, 2004). 
The theory of environmental determinism relies heavily on the idea that the 
surrounding environment directly impacts change and the setting of goals within the 
organization or agency (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998). For instance, certain 
determination factors associated with a particular environment ultimately decide how an 
organization can potentially behave. Organizations, therefore, manage complexity and 
change according to some factors beyond their control. Those in support of 
environmental determinism contend that changes and choices made within an 
organization are restricted and confined by the environment in which they operate. In 
addition, environmental determinists conceptualize an environment as a cache of 
resources that limit and control an organization. Gopalakrishnan and Dugal (1998) clarify 
this by suggesting that an environment is viewed in particular dimensions, which include 
capacity, stability, and complexity. Determinists also believe that an organization must 
adapt to the most prevalent capacity, stability, and complexity of its environment or it 
will cease to exist. In this sense, an organization’s actions and behavior become entirely 
reactive due to its environment (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 
1985).   
  Determinism proposes that organizational behavior is actually determined by 
and reacts to structural and social constraints (Whittington, 1988). Scholars adopting this 
ideology assume that circumstantial constraints present limited and specific effects that 
dramatically reduce the number of options and ways in which an organization can 
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behave, thus implying that the environment ultimately shapes organizational behavior 
and strategies of adaptation. Conversely, the limited number of possibilities in the ways 
an organization can behave in relation to its environment stems from the current 
structural and social constraints. In terms of possibilities, the organization may have the 
ability to choose from a limited number. However, the organization’s environment 
ultimately chooses the only outcome compatible to the organization’s survival, 
insinuating that all other potential courses of action made available by an organization’s 
environment lead to non-existence (Whittington, 1988).    
As for the strategic choice perspective, organizational actors or agents act 
autonomously in proactive and potentially creative ways to alter the path of their 
organization (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998). Having a choice in strategy implies that 
there is a pattern in a stream of decisions (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Unlike 
determinists, strategic choice theorists advocate that an organization is constrained by the 
way it socially and structurally constructs its environment (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 
1998). Other strategic choice theorists support this notion by adding that an organization 
does not react to its environment but instead enacts it. In other words, an organization 
creates its own environment by the choices it makes. By an organization enacting its own 
environment, it also creates the possibility of proactive and opportunistic decision-
making processes (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998). 
  Strategic choice also proposes that an organization is a natural system in which 
decision-making is usually justified or rationalized by that organization and that the 
action and behavior of an organization stems from interconnected meanings that an 
organization itself constructs (Child, 1997). In addition, it is advocated by many strategic 
	   16	  
choice theorists that organizations can, in fact, choose the environment in which they 
want to operate, and then structure and create decisions based on the environment they 
have chosen to enact. An organization’s decision-making process exercises strategic 
choice by evaluating the organization’s current situation, the expectations placed on it by 
external resources, the trend of relevant external events, the organization’s recent 
performance, and how comfortable an organization is with the decisions it makes (Child, 
1997). 
Some researchers also argue that in order for an organization to utilize strategic 
choice, it must eliminate all potential environmental constraints (Whittington, 1988). The 
same individuals contending this notion emphasize that by eliminating all potential 
environmental constraints, an organization also eliminates preconditions. However, this is 
where many authors and researchers fail to observe that strategic choice can still be 
utilized by not dissolving or refusing to recognize that there may be some preconditions 
present in an organization’s environment. An organization does not necessarily have to 
dissolve or eliminate all environmental factors and preconditions in order for strategic 
choice to be at play. Organizations at some point in time experience some ability to make 
a strategic choice about its actions and behavior, but are still constrained by some aspects 
of its environment (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998). When an organization experiences 
that point in time where a strategic choice can be made but is still constrained by certain 
aspects of its environment, then the organization is participating in organizational 
adaptation (Gopalakrishnan & Dugal, 1998).  
As Child (1997) implies, an organization does not constitute its environment. 
Therefore, the environment consists of other actors in other organizations. Each 
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organization may experience similar or distinctively different events within an 
environment that potentially directs it to react a certain way. The analysis of 
organizations in this study puts forth the notion that specific characteristics and factors 
within an environment ultimately determine the way in which an organization will 
behave. The factors observed are comprised of environmental aspects.  
By an empirical examination of the potential factors mentioned earlier (i.e., crime 
rates, diversity in mayoral leadership, poverty level, the police-citizen ratio, agency 
demographic make-up, level of citizen complaints, and collective bargaining), this study 
considers the relevance of both environmental determinism and strategic choice with 
regard to changes in police accountability structures. Since it would be highly irregular 
for a police agency to unilaterally make the decision to create a citizen oversight agency, 
the analysis here conceives local governments in general as the units of analysis. To the 
extent that the aforementioned variables have predictive value in explaining the existence 
of citizen oversight, the suggestion of environmental determinism is implied; on the other 
hand, strategic choice would likely indicate more independence across agencies in terms 
of organization adaptation.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Model Specification 
 
 
In order to examine deterministic factors that may exert influence on the existence 
of citizen oversight in the 100 largest cities, this research considers variables that have 
been suggested by other researchers as important, such as collective 
bargaining/unionization, mayoral diversity, population diversity, volume of citizen 
complaints, police-citizen ratio, and crime rate. Also included as control variables is 
poverty level of jurisdiction and police agency diversity. The conceptual model therefore 
includes both traditional factors and control variables that vary across agencies in the 
jurisdictions under observation. Because of the nature of the sample the potential variable 
of agency size is considered a constant; however, the police-citizen ratio may better 
capture the potential level of interaction between the police and the public. 
 For this analysis, the dependent variable is a dichotomous one, indicating whether 
or not jurisdictions in the study have citizen oversight agencies. Both the traditional and 
control variables are used in regression analysis to illustrate their explanatory power in 
predicting the existence of external police accountability. Based primarily on the extant 
research, the following hypotheses are considered: 
1. A higher level of mayoral diversity will positively relate to the existence of 
citizen oversight; 
2. The presence of collective bargaining in jurisdictions will influence the 
existence of citizen oversight; 
3. A higher crime rate within jurisdiction will positively impact the existence of 
citizen oversight; and 
4. Agencies with higher rates of citizen complaints will positively relate to the 
existence of citizen oversight. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Data 
A total of one hundred largest United States cities are sampled for the current 
analysis. The size of cities is measured with the number of overall population in the 2010 
Census Report. Data is collected from various sources that specialize in providing 
information utilized in the construction of the variables for this research and for each city 
examined. Sources employed to collect information include the Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) data, the 2010 Census Report, the 
websites of corresponding cities, and the 2010 Uniform Crime Report. Table 1 shows the 
sources employed to collect information for each variable and operationalization. 
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Table 1: Operationalization and Sources of Variables (n=100) 
Variables  Measurement   Data Source 
      
Oversight  Yes or No 
(1=Yes) 
  LEMAS 2007 
Collective Bargaining  Yes or No 
(1=Yes)  
  LEMAS 2007 
Poverty Level  % of Persons Below 
Poverty Line 
  CENSUS 2010 
Agency Diversity  % of Non-White   LEMAS 2007 
Minority in Population  % of Minority   CENSUS 2010 
Minority Mayor  % of Minority Mayo in 
30 Years 
  City Websites  & 
supplemental web 
searches 
Female Mayor  % of Female Mayor in 
30 Years 
  City Websites & 
supplemental web 
searches 
Police Ratio  Ratio of Police to 
Citizens 
  UCR 2010 
 
Complaint Rate 
  
Number of complains 
by 100,000 
   
LEMAS 2007 
Crime Rate  Number of crimes by 
100,000 
  UCR 2010 
+Oversight variable (dependent variable) was collected from the most recent ongoing 
survey that collects data on the topic. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 For the purpose of this study, agency oversight is introduced as the dependent 
variable. It represents the existence of external oversight of the police in each city 
examined and is measured by whether or not each city has external oversight for its 
police department. The analysis presented indicates that 39% of the departments observed 
have some form of agency oversight. This percentage is computed based on the data 
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collected by the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics in the year 
2007.   
 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables in this study are a combination of demographic 
information for the cities sampled and others that are introduced to examine specific 
characteristics of police departments. The total number of independent variables is nine, 
such as: collective bargaining, poverty level, agency diversity, minority in population, 
minority mayor, female mayor, police-citizen ratio, complaints by population, and crime 
rate. Four of these variables, mayoral diversity, collective bargaining, crime rate, and 
complaints by population, can be classified into the theoretical framework of 
environmental determinism, which may be related to the existence of oversight. Mayoral 
diversity, collective bargaining, crime rate, and complaints by population are 
characteristics of a city and police department’s environment. These specific variables are 
the attributes of the cities and departments sampled and introduced to examine whether or 
not they have an effect on local governments implementing oversight. 
The first independent variable, collective bargaining, indicates whether or not a 
police department retains a process of negotiations aiming at reaching agreements that 
regulate working conditions between a police department and its’ officers. This variable 
is not measured as employing strict unionization due to the inability to receive enough 
information on unions for police departments in the cities. Police departments have the 
authority to allow their officers to unionize or have the ability to negotiate working 
conditions. The fact that departments allow their officers to participate in one of the 
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aforementioned abilities gives this study the opportunity to examine whether or not a 
department grants its’ officers the capability of having a form of collective bargaining.  
 Another independent (control) variable that is tested is poverty level.  Poverty 
level denotes the percent of individuals of a city’s population that are below the poverty 
line. This variable is introduced mainly for two reasons. It is suggested that individuals 
who are below the poverty line tend to have more contact with police, in general. In 
addition, individuals below the poverty line might also have a worse view of the police. 
These two factors insinuate that due to more contact and an unfavorable view of the 
police, more issues are likely to arise, which would call for a city government to institute 
an organization, such as external oversight, to review such problems.  
 Agency diversity is also introduced as an independent variable. It indicates the 
racial diversity of police officers, and is operationalized as the percent of non-white 
officers within each department. Agency diversity is analyzed since it represents the 
racial composition of each department’s officers. Like collective bargaining, agency 
diversity is important in explaining the existence of external oversight since it is a 
characteristic of all police departments in the cities observed. Police departments are not 
likely to have only white officers employed. Therefore, it is necessary to observe those 
departments that have a greater diversity of officers that are non-white and its relation to 
existing oversight organizations. The racial diversity of police officers is intended to 
detect whether or not the size of minority representation has an effect on the existence of 
external review.  
 An additional independent variable, minority in population, is introduced to 
observe the effect of a minority population on the existence of external oversight. For this 
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study, the African American population of a city, determined by the 2010 Census Report, 
is utilized to construct this variable. Therefore, minority in population incorporates the 
percent of individuals that are African American in each city’s overall population. 
Previous research has included this factor to provide a representation of a city’s minority 
population and its influence on the existence of external oversight (Walker & Bumphus, 
1992; Saltzstein, 1989).  
A third variable dealing with minorities is introduced as minority mayor. This 
indicates the percent of African American mayors in the last 30 years in each city. 
Walker & Bumphus (1992) noted that a significant change in the balance of power in the 
context of municipal politics might be one explanation for external oversight growth. In 
addition, they indicate that an increase in African American political power has 
contributed to this growth. Therefore, the purpose of introducing this variable in the 
current research is to determine whether or not it has any significant relation to the 
existence of oversight. It is further implied that African American mayoral-ship might 
have a correlation with cities that have a larger African American population and could 
affect the relationship to the existence of oversight. 
 Female mayor is also introduced to observe municipal politics in each city. It 
represents the percent of female mayors in the last 30 years in the cities. With minority 
groups being represented in municipal politics, it is also meaningful to determine whether 
or not the gender of a mayor could have any influence on the existence of external 
oversight. Overtime, females have become more involved in the voting process and 
running for political positions. This has arguably become a common trend throughout our 
nation’s various political levels and could impact external oversight existence.  
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The independent variable police-citizen ratio is constructed as the number of 
sworn police officers in comparison to the number of citizens in each city. Police-citizen 
ratio is introduced in order to investigate if cities with a relatively higher number of 
police officers are more likely to have an external oversight organization. The higher 
police-citizen ratio produces a higher level of interaction between police and citizens 
since the opportunity to interact is greater with more sworn police officers. This may also 
contribute to the increment of complaints from citizens concerning sworn police officers 
and their operations.  
 In order to reflect the influence of complaints by citizens concerning the police, 
the independent variable complaint rate is employed as the number of complaints in 
relation to a city’s overall population. The majority of the prevailing research has studied 
this factor as having a key contribution to the existence of external oversight (Goldsmith 
& Lewis, 2000; Walker, 2001; Burns & Hollwedel, 2012; Walker & Bumphus, 1992). 
However, few studies have analyzed its interaction with other potential influences as 
presented in the current analysis. Studies that have reviewed the number of complaints by 
citizens suggest that there is a significant relationship with the growth and the existence 
of external oversight. In addition, the effectiveness of the complaint process has been 
evaluated in previous studies to determine its effect on whether or not a city has external 
oversight (Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Walker, 2001; Burns & Hollwedel, 2012; Walker 
& Bumphus, 1992). This path is not introduced and is beyond the scope of this study 
because even though it might explain instances of creation and growth, it simultaneously 
implies longitudinal and/or historical data collection.  
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The last independent variable introduced is crime rate. Crime rate is measured as 
the number of crimes per 100,000 committed in each city in 2010. The types of crimes 
are derived from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and 
include property crimes, which include the offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor 
vehicle theft, and arson. Theft-type offenses are defined as the taking of money or 
property without force or the threat of force against victims. In accordance with the UCR, 
arson is included in this category because the offense involves the destruction of 
property. It is suggested that the crime rate in cities can encourage police departments 
and city governments to adopt methods or policies to reduce crime, with external 
oversight being one of those techniques.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
Findings 
 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N = 100) 
 
Variable Freq % Mean S.D. 
Oversight     
     Yes (1) 39 39.0%   
Collective Bargaining     
     Yes (1) 64 64.0%   
Poverty Level   18.63 6.08 
Agency Diversity	     32.36 18.99 
Minority in Population	     21.99 18.40 
Minority Mayor	     21.80 29.30 
Female Mayor	     14.39 16.51 
Police Ratio	     2.35 1.08 
Complaint Rate   1.49 2.68 
Crime Rate   43.28 15.04 
+ Poverty level indicates percent below poverty line and minority mayor/ female mayor mean 
over a 30-year period (1980-2010).  Police ratio and crime rate is the mean per 1000 people, and 
complain rate is the mean per 10,000 people.  
 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables. The total number of 
cities sampled is 100. The dependent variable, oversight, is a dichotomous variable and is 
measured by No (0) and Yes (1). The frequency of agencies that do have oversight is 39. 
Therefore, 39 % of the agencies included in this study have some form of external 
oversight. All independent variables analyzed are scale data with an exception of 
collective bargaining, which is a dichotomous variable.  
The frequency of agencies that have collective bargaining is 64, indicating that 
64% of the agencies have collective bargaining. The mean poverty level for the cities in 
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this study is 18.63, which indicates that the average percentage of people falling below 
the poverty line is 18.63. For agency diversity, a mean percentage of 32.36 of non-whites 
existed in agencies, with a standard deviation of 18.99. Minority in population has a 
mean percentage of 21.99 and a standard deviation of 18.40. Minority mayor percentage 
(over 30 year period) has a mean of 21.80 with a standard deviation of 29.30, while 
female mayor has a mean percentage of 14.39 and standard deviation of 16.51. As for 
police-ratio, it has a mean of 2.35 and indicates that there are 2.35 police officers per 
1,000 people on average. Finally, complaint rate provides a mean of 1.49 per 10,000 
people and a standard deviation of 2.68, while crime rate reveals a mean of 43.28/ per 
1,000 people with a standard deviation of 15.04.  
Based on the previous research, it was expected that more agencies would have 
citizen oversight than observed in this study. Furthermore, it was expected that there 
would be a higher percentage of agencies providing the option of collective bargaining. 
According to prior research, over two-thirds of the police departments in our country’s 50 
largest cities had some form of external oversight in 1992 (Walker & Bumphus, 1992; 
Walker 2001; De Angelis, 2009; Hollwedel & Burns, 2012). When isolating the 50 
largest cities in this sample, the two-thirds’ finding from Walker and Bumphus (1992) 
remains virtually unchanged. However, by the year 2000, there were at least 100 different 
oversight organizations in existence with the majority of those implemented in larger 
metropolitan cities (De Angelis, 2009; Farrow & Pham, 2003; Walker & Bumphus, 1992; 
Walker, 2001; Merrick, 2002). With only 39% of the agencies included in this study 
having some form of oversight, it is evident that not much growth, if any, has occurred 
since 2000. As for 64% percent of agencies providing the option of collective bargaining, 
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this finding could suggest that there is a trend that police departments are moving away 
from allowing their officers to unionize and, instead, offering only negotiating abilities. 
 
 
Table 3.  Logistic Regression for Oversight Agency Existence 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
Collective Bargaining  2.934 .961     .002** 18.800 
 Poverty Level -.046 .087 .598 .955 
Agency Diversity -.016 .019 .412 .985 
 Minority in Population -.062 .036 .085 .940 
 Minority Mayor -.004 .014 .748 .996 	  Female Mayor .002 .019 .933 1.002 
 Police Ratio 1.891 .807   .019* 6.627 
 Complaint by Population .226 .122   .064* 1.254 
 Crime Rate .111 .039     .004** 1.117 
 Constant -9.577 2.432 .000 .000 
     
     
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
+p < .1, .01 *p < .05, **  
 
 
Table 3 shows the results from the logistic analysis predicting the existence of 
having an oversight agency. Three significant predictors are indicated by the analysis, 
which include: collective bargaining, police-ratio, and crime rate. An additional 
independent variable, complaint by population, borders on significance and is also 
worthy of further consideration. Collective bargaining has a slope of 2.934(p < .01) and 
suggests that agencies that have collective bargaining abilities are more likely to have 
oversight agencies in their jurisdictions. It was expected the presence of collective 
bargaining in jurisdictions would influence the existence of citizen oversight. This can be 
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due to the notion that a local government might find it necessary to have citizen oversight 
in order to review the fairness of the collective bargaining process for officers and if 
those officers should have it at all.  
Secondly, the police-ratio variable exhibits a slope of 1.891 (p < .05), which 
indicates that jurisdictions with higher police-citizen ratios are more likely to have an 
oversight agency. The significant relationship between the police-ratio variable and 
oversight was not expected. However, this relationship may due to more police officers 
being present in a city, which allows for more contact with that city’s population. 
Therefore, a city’s government may find it essential to have external oversight to deal 
with issues that could arise from more contact between the police and citizens. As for 
crime rate, the slope of .004 (p < .01) reveals that jurisdictions with higher crime rates are 
more likely to have existing oversight agencies. It can be interpreted, theoretically, that 
jurisdictions experiencing high crime rates are more likely to have citizen oversight. This 
can result from the concept that as more crimes are committed within a jurisdiction the 
greater chance a city finds it necessary to take action to reduce it’s crime rate, resulting in 
implementing external oversight.  
Complaints by population is hypothesized to have a positive relationship with the 
existence of oversight. With a slope of .226 and a significance level of .064, it slightly 
fails to reach the prerequisite level of .05. Considering the relatively small sample size, 
this result can be presented as meaningful and may indicate that higher level of 
complaints increase the likelihood of oversight existence; however, we find no support 
for the hypothesis indicating a positive relationship between complaints by population 
and oversight. 
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Though minority mayor is projected to have a positive impact on the existence of 
oversight, the analysis reveals a negative, however not significant, relationship between 
the two variables with a slope of .004. The non-significant relationship between minority 
mayor and oversight in this study is contrary to previous and existing research. According 
to prior research conducted by Walker & Bumphus (1992) and Saltzstein (1989) the race 
of a city’s mayor should have an effect on the existence of oversight agencies. Therefore, 
it is suggested that there is not a significant relationship in this analysis due to the 
interaction of minority mayor with the other variables presented. While female mayor 
reveals a positive slope of.002, the finding is not significant.   
 The three remaining variables poverty level, agency diversity, and minority in 
population reveal no significant relationships with the existence of oversight, with all 
three respectively having negative slopes of -.046, -.016, and -.062. Poverty level and 
agency diversity are included as control variables; therefore, no expected relationships 
are hypothesized. The non-significance of the minority in population variable is 
consistent with the finding from Walker and Bumphus (1992) that identified the existence 
of oversight in both small and large minority jurisdictions. 
 
Limitations/Delimitations 
 Limitations of existing data are present among prior research. Many studies 
provide factors such as concern over police accountability, poor-police community 
relations, increases in the number of citizen complaints, and poor citizen complaint 
processes as reasons for growth in oversight (Walker, 2001; Hudson, 1971; Burns & 
Hollwedel, 2012; Banks, 2013; Stone & Bobb, 2002; Saltzstein, 1989; Bobb, 2002; 
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Walker & Bumphus, 1992). Much of this research has been historical in nature and has 
yet to examine the potential influential power of other factors on the existence of 
oversight like the ones presented in this study. Additionally, previous research has mainly 
concentrated only on explaining the growth of external oversight and not existence, in 
general (Walker, 2001; Hudson, 1971; Burns & Hollwedel, 2012; Bobb, 2002).  
This particular study is the first of its kind; thus it is primarily exploratory in 
nature. It does not attempt to provide a longitudinal analysis of citizen oversight or test 
the theory presented. Therefore, the main attempt is to offer a foundation and beginning 
exploratory framework for existence. Due to the lack of extensive exploratory studies, 
this research sets out to give an empirical, cross-sectional analysis of potential reasons for 
external oversight existence in a non-historical context. Although the growth of these 
organizations is important and necessary to understanding this phenomenon, it is not the 
concentration of this analysis. The intention is not to examine growth, but rather to 
provide possible factors for the existence of citizen oversight. As with all existing data 
analysis, there may be issues with validity, completeness, and accuracy. Finally, 
consideration should always been given to how and why the data is collected and the 
political priorities that may be evident, especially in governmental data collection. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
Discussion 
 
 
As presented in the hypotheses, it was expected that the presence of collective 
bargaining in jurisdictions would have an influence on the existence of oversight in the 
agencies observed. In addition, it was expected that a higher crime rate within a 
jurisdiction would impact the existence of citizen oversight. As for complaints by 
population, it was expected that it would positively relate to the existence of citizen 
oversight. Even though no significant relationship was noted between complaints by 
population and oversight at the .05 level, it came exceedingly close to yielding a 
significant relationship, which may indicate the influence of a small sample size. 
Conversely, it was expected that a higher level of mayoral diversity would positively 
relate to the existence of citizen oversight. Unfortunately, this was not the case. A 
positive and significant relationship was not detected between minority mayor and 
oversight. Interestingly, cities with a higher percent of female mayors in the last 30 years 
did indicate a positive relationship with oversight, but the findings were not significant. 
 It can be interpreted, theoretically, that jurisdictions experiencing high crime rates 
are more likely to have citizen oversight. This can result from the concept that as more 
crimes are committed within a jurisdiction the greater chance a city finds it necessary to 
take action to reduce its’ crime rate, resulting in implementing external oversight. It can 
also be inferred that agencies with collective bargaining are more likely to have a form of 
oversight. This can be due to the notion that a local government might find it necessary to 
have citizen oversight in order to review the fairness of the collective bargaining process 
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of officers and if those officers should have it at all.  Therefore, both higher crime rates 
and the ability for police officers to enter into collective bargaining emerge as two 
deterministic factors related to the existence of oversight. According to the environmental 
determinism perspectives, these factors may exert pressure on local governments to 
institute external oversight due to real or perceived community relations problems.  
Saltzstein (1989) has noted the perceptions of crime in large metropolitans with visible 
minority populations may exert pressure on local governments to manage perceptions by 
implementing new programs and procedures. 
 The significant relationship between police ratio and oversight may insinuate that 
jurisdictions having a higher police-citizen ratio may choose to implement an external 
review process. As mentioned earlier, more police officers present in a city allows for 
more contact with that city’s population. Therefore, a city’s government may find it 
essential to have external oversight to deal with issues that could arise from more contact 
between the police and citizens. The presence of more police officers and greater contact 
with the public leads to the potential for more complaints against the police. Although, no 
significant relationship was indicated between complaints by population and oversight, 
the positive relationship and close significance level implies that complaints could have 
an effect on whether or not a city has citizen oversight, even though the relationship is 
not as significant as other variables. Previous studies suggested that an increase in 
complaints have an effect on the existence of oversight (Ferdik, 2013; Farrow & Pham, 
2003; Burns & Hollwedel, 2012; Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Bobb, 2002). .  
 Even though it was suggested that the level of poverty might control for the 
existence of oversight due to the belief that individuals who are below the poverty line 
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may have a worse view of the police, this was not suggested by the analysis. The access 
to the citizen complaints process may be a factor influencing this finding. Based on the 
research by Walker & Bumphus (1992), it was expected that cities with a higher percent 
of African American mayors in the last 30 years would influence those cities having 
citizen oversight. Although this was not concluded in the analysis, it is suggested that 
voting trends in a city could have an effect on whether or not a local government decides 
to implement oversight. It is further suggested that African American mayoral-ship may 
not have a correlation with cities that have a larger African American population, which 
could ultimately have an effect on external oversight existence.  
 Concerning African American communities, Saltzstein (1989) indicated in her 
study that in some urban jurisdictions the implementation of external review of the police 
stemmed from a form of community-oriented policing. This occurred through a specific 
style of community-oriented policing, which was geared toward the needs of African 
American communities. Therefore, external oversight had become a form of community-
oriented policing to help address issues concerning a particular minority population. 
Although, this analysis does not observe specific styles of community-oriented policing 
and its affect on minority populations, there are a few things to take away from this 
concept.  
 It can, therefore, be hypothesized that the reason for no significant relationship 
between minority mayor and oversight is due to the notion that the mayor may be unable 
to influence the installation of citizen oversight as much as it was theorized. In addition, 
the race of a mayor may not matter at all as to whether a city has an external oversight 
entity. The other variable concerning the African American community, minority in 
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population, does not show any relationship to oversight. Again, extant research (Walker 
& Bumphus, 1992) noted the variety of oversight agencies existing across jurisdictions 
with varying degrees of minority representation.  
 The factors utilized and observed in this study have significant relevance to the 
theory of environmental determinism introduced earlier. Using local governments as the 
units of analysis, this analysis suggests that environmental influences are indeed at play. 
Overall crime rate, police-citizen ratio, and collective bargaining emerge as significant 
predictors of the existence of oversight. These external variables may exert influence on 
local governments to establish citizen oversight as a way to manage organizational 
complexity. It can be posited that local governments are constrained by these variables in 
their decision-making processes.  
 As Whittington (1988), proposes, circumstantial constraints within an 
environment present limited and specific effects that dramatically reduce the number of 
options and ways in which an organization can behave. Therefore, it is implied that the 
environment ultimately shapes organizational behavior and strategies for adaptation 
(Whittington, 1988). In this case, constraints of an environment that ultimately 
determines how an organization (local government) may behave are comprised of crime 
rates, minority population, minority mayor, female mayor, and collective bargaining, 
agency diversity, complaints by population, police-citizen ratio, and poverty level. These 
constraints, whether social or structural, can be theoretically viewed as reasons for a local 
government being reactive toward the constraints, resulting in the implementation of 
external oversight.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
  
 
This study implies that there are certain environmental factors within a local 
government and police department that have a significant relationship with the existence 
of external oversight. In addition, it is evident that there are other factors and reasons for 
external oversight existence other than various types of external review and complaint 
processes. Although it is still important to investigate the influence of the aforementioned 
factors, the inclusion of more traditional variables are pertinent to further understanding 
why a local government is more apt to have external oversight. Further implications 
include the notion that departments with collective bargaining, higher police-citizen ratio, 
and higher crime rates have a significant effect on external oversight existence. This 
indicates that local governments and departments experiencing a greater interaction with 
the public and a higher number of crimes committed are more likely to implement an 
external oversight process.   
 There is an obvious need for further empirical research into the phenomenon of 
external oversight existence. Furthermore, the factors observed as potential reasons for 
the growth or existence of external oversight might need to be re-evaluated. For example, 
the ability for police departments to allow its’ officers to have collective bargaining rights 
should be included in future studies, rather than the right to unionize. Over half of the 
police departments observed had some form of collective bargaining. This may suggest 
that unionization may be becoming a process of the past. With so many local 
governments allowing its’ officers to have negotiating rights, a symbiotic relationship 
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between oversight and collective bargaining is a possibility and may be more correlative 
than causal. To further imply the importance of including collective bargaining in future 
analysis, it must be reiterated that out of the nine variables presented, collective 
bargaining was one of only three factors that exhibited the prerequisite level of 
significance. 
 It is evident that the crime rate of a city does have an impact of whether a city 
installs an external oversight process. For future studies, it would be interesting to 
investigate if specific crimes have an effect on external oversight existence and not just 
the overall crime rate. For over two decades, the majority of research conducted 
concerning external oversight has been conducted from a historical context. This study 
does not definitively conclude why a local government has an external oversight 
organization. One study, alone, cannot accomplish this task. Therefore, it is encouraged 
that future research and inquiries into this topic should take a similar exploratory and 
empirically investigative path to further understanding the existence of these 
organizations.  
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